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Background: There may be a risk of COVID-19 transmission to rescuers delivering treatment 
for cardiac arrest. The aim of this review was to identify the potential risk of transmission 
associated with key interventions (chest compressions, defibrillation, cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation) to inform international treatment recommendations. 
 
Methods: We undertook a systematic review comprising three questions: 1) aerosol 
generation associated with key interventions; 2) risk of airborne infection transmission 
associated with key interventions; and 3) the effect of different personal protective 
equipment strategies. We searched MEDLINE, Embase, Cochrane Central Register of 
Controlled Trials, and the World Health Organisation COVID-19 database on 24th March 
2020. Eligibility criteria were developed individually for each question. We assessed risk of 
bias for individual studies, and used the GRADE process to assess evidence certainty by 
outcome.  
 
Results: We included eleven studies: two cohort studies, one case control study, five case 
reports, and three manikin randomised controlled trials. We did not find any direct evidence 
that chest compressions or defibrillation either are or are not associated with aerosol 
generation or transmission of infection. Data from manikin studies indicates that donning of 
personal protective equipment delays treatment delivery. Studies provided only indirect 
evidence, with no study describing patients with COVID-19. Evidence certainty was low or 
very low for all outcomes.  
 
Conclusion: It is uncertain whether chest compressions or defibrillation cause aerosol 
generation or transmission of COVID-19 to rescuers. There is very limited evidence and a 
rapid need for further studies.  
 





The World Health Organization (WHO) declared a Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
Coronavirus two (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic on 11 March 2020. As of 4th April 2020, over one 
million individuals are reported to have been infected with Coronavirus Disease 2019 
(COVID-19), of which over 55,000 have died.1 Data from China highlight the potential risk to 
healthcare workers when undertaking aerosol generating procedures (AGP) in COVID-19 
patients.2 
 
The WHO has categorised cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) as an aerosol generating 
procedure, requiring the wearing of respirator masks and other personal protective 
equipment (PPE).3, 4 In contrast, some national guidance describes chest compressions and 
defibrillation as non-aerosol generating procedures.5 The discordance between WHO and 
national guidance may reflect differences in terminology, specifically WHO uses the term 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation to incorporate chest compressions, defibrillation and 
associated airway manoeuvres. Nevertheless, a 2012 review on Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) transmission identified uncertainty about the aerosol generating potential 
of chest compressions and defibrillation.6  
 
Current resuscitation guidelines highlight the importance of rescuer safety.7 Delaying the 
delivery of chest compressions and defibrillation for up to several minutes for healthcare 
workers to don personal protective equipment (PPE) will reduce the likelihood of patient 
survival.8-10 In contrast, the delivery of aerosol generating procedures to a patient infected 
with COVID-19 may place healthcare workers at risk. Driven by concern amongst the clinical 
community as to the optimum approach in cardiac arrest, the International Liaison 
Committee on Resuscitation (ILCOR) identified the urgent need for a review of current 
evidence to inform international resuscitation treatment recommendations in patients with 





We undertook a systematic review to explore three key questions relating to the 
transmission of COVID-19 in relation to chest compressions, defibrillation and CPR (box 
one). In view of the urgent need for evidence to inform international policy, the review was 
completed in four-days. Our review was prospectively registered with PROSPERO 
(CRD42020175594) and is written in accordance with the PRISMA statement.11  
 
Our first two research questions examined the association between key resuscitation 
interventions (chest compressions, defibrillation, CPR) and aerosol generation and airborne 
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transmission of infection. Our third question examined the effect of different personal 
protective equipment systems (supplementary information).  
 
Search strategy 
The information specialist iteratively developed the search strategy in consultation with 
other project team members and drawing on the strategy developed for a previous 
review.12 We undertook a single search to encompass all three review questions. We 
searched MEDLINE (OVID interface), Embase (OVID interface), Cochrane Central Register of 
Controlled Trials, and the Database of publications on coronavirus disease (COVID-19) 
developed by the World Health Organisation,13 all from inception to 24th March 2020. We 
updated the search using the WHO COVID-19 database on 6th April 2020. Our full record of 
searches is included in the supplementary information. 
 
In addition, we used the Science Citation Index (Web of Science) to identify additional 
citations from a relevant Canadian review published in 2011.6, 12 We also assessed the 
reference lists of three relevant reviews.6, 12, 14 Finally, we identified additional citations 
through consultation with subject experts.  
 
Study eligibility 
We assessed study inclusion using pre-defined study criteria based on the research question 
(see supplementary information). For all questions, we included randomised controlled 
trials and non-randomised studies (e.g., interrupted time series, controlled before-and-after 
studies, cohort studies). For questions one and two, we additionally included case reports 
and case-series. For questions one and three we included cadaver studies, and for question 
three included manikin studies.  
 
For all studies, we required that the study be set in the context of a cardiac arrest, with 
delivery of chest compressions and/or defibrillation and/or CPR by any individual 
(healthcare worker or lay person). For infection transmission, we included all types of 
infection (viral/bacterial/fungal) with presumed airborne transmission. We imposed no date 
or language restrictions provided there was an English language abstract.  
 
Article selection  
On search completion, we used EndNote X9 software to systematically identify and remove 
duplicate citations. Titles/abstracts were reviewed independently by two reviewers from 
the team (two of STP/AG/AM), and obviously irrelevant citations excluded. We 
subsequently sourced full-text papers, with eligibility independently assessed by two 
reviewers (AG/AM) against pre-specified criteria. At each stage, disagreements were 
discussed and reconciled or referred to a third reviewer for adjudication (KC).  
 
Data extraction and analysis  
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A single reviewer from the team (one of STP/AG/KF/OO) extracted data from eligible full-
text papers using a piloted data extraction form. Accuracy was assessed by a second 
reviewer. We extracted key data from each study relevant to the specific research question, 
including details of population, exposure, intervention/ comparator, outcome and type of 
infection. Disagreements between reviewers were resolved by consensus, or consultation 
with a third reviewer (KC). Where a publication was eligible for inclusion for more than one 
research question, data were extracted into a single data extraction form record.  
 
Risk of bias assessment and assessment of certainty of evidence 
A single reviewer from the team (one of STP/AG/KF/OO) assessed risk of bias of full-text 
papers using quality assessment tools that were appropriate for each study design. We used 
the modified Cochrane Collaboration Risk of Bias tool for randomised controlled trials;15 the 
Evidence Partners tool for case-control studies and cohort studies;16, 17 and the Murad tool 
for case reports and case series.18 Assessment accuracy was evaluated by a second reviewer 
(one of STP/AG/KF/OO). We used the GRADE system to assess certainty of evidence per 
outcome (outcomes for each question are listed in box one).19  
 
Data analysis 
We anticipated that identified studies would be heterogeneous. We assessed studies for 
clinical, methodological, and statistical heterogeneity, Where not precluded by 
heterogeneity, we intended to consider pooling data in a meta-analysis using a random-
effects model. In the likely event that a meta-analysis was precluded, we planned a 




Searches of databases and other sources identified 749 citations. Following removal of 
duplicates and screening of titles/abstracts, we retrieved 38 full-text papers of which 11 
were eligible for inclusion in the review (see Figure 1).20-30 The electronic supplement 
includes characteristics of included studies, and a list of reasons for excluding studies at full 
text review. 
 
Of the 11 papers, we included two studies for question one,20, 26 eight for question two, 20-27 
and three for question three.28-30 Both papers included in question one were also included 
in question two. We included five case reports,20-23, 26 three observational studies,24, 25, 27 
and three manikin randomised controlled trials.28-30 None of the included papers described 
a patient with COVID-19. Study risk of bias assessments and GRADE tables are included in 
the electronic supplement.  
 
Question one - aerosol generation 
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We did not find any direct evidence that chest compressions or defibrillation either did or 
did not generate aerosols. We included data from two case reports providing indirect 
evidence of aerosol generation.20, 26 In both cases, a healthcare worker contracted an 
infection from patients undergoing CPR, which the report authors attribute to aerosol 
generation. In both cases, patients underwent prolonged resuscitation attempts that likely 
incorporated ventilation. Neither patient is reported as receiving defibrillation. In one case, 
the healthcare worker is described as wearing appropriate PPE. 26 Evidence certainty was 
categorised as very low.  
 
Question two - transmission of infection 
We did not find any direct evidence that chest compressions or defibrillation either are or 
are not associated with transmission of infection. We included indirect evidence from eight 
studies: two retrospective cohort studies,25, 27 one case-control study24 and five case 
reports.20-23, 26 Studies are summarised in Table one. 
 
In the two cohort studies, the authors compared SARS infection transmission in individuals 
who were exposed and not exposed to specific interventions.25, 27 Both studies were 
undertaken in Canada and examined SARS transmission. In one study of 697 healthcare 
workers, only nine individuals were exposed to chest compressions and four were exposed 
to defibrillation.27 In the other study of 43 healthcare workers, eight individuals were 
exposed to CPR and defibrillation. Neither study identified a statistically significant 
association between these exposures and infection transmission. Key study limitations were 
the lack of clear definition of exposures and inability to account for multiple exposures.  
 
In the case-control study, 51 healthcare workers with probable SARS were compared with 
477 healthcare workers without infection.24 There was a correlation between giving chest 
compressions and tracheal intubation, indicating that often healthcare workers who were 
exposed to one were often exposed to the other. A multivariate analysis suggested that 
exposure to chest compressions was associated with an increased odds of probable SARS 
infection (odds ratio 4.52, 95% confidence interval 1.08 to 18.81). However, the omission of 
tracheal intubation in the multivariate model may mean the reported risk is primarily driven 
by tracheal intubation or other airway manoeuvres (e.g. bag-mask ventilation) associated 
with chest compressions. Questionnaires that collected details of exposure were completed 
one to four months after exposure, and so may be subject to recall bias.  
 
In the five case reports, the reported transmissions were: Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS), Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), tuberculosis, novel 
bunyavirus, designated Severe Fever with Thrombocytopenia Syndrome (SFTS) virus, and 
Panton-Valentine leucocidin.20-23, 26 The use of PPE varied across reports. In none of the 
cases was delivery of defibrillation described. In all cases, the patients appear to have 
received airway manoeuvres alongside chest compressions. In one case report,21 a nurse 
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wearing full PPE delivered chest compressions to a patient with SARS for 15-minutes and 
subsequently developed symptoms of infection. However, based on timings presented in 
the study it is likely the nurse was also present in the room during airway manoeuvres.  
 
All studies and reports may be subject to recall bias, both in relation to the PPE worn and 
the procedures undertaken. Evidence certainty was assessed as very low.  
 
Question three- personal protective equipment strategies 
For question three, we included three manikin RCTs that recruited 104 participants.22, 29, 30 
One study was individually randomised,30 and the other two were crossover RCTs.22, 29 All 
studies simulated chest compression or CPR delivery. Two studies compared different types 
of respirator22, 29 and one study compared different types of gown.30 Characteristics of 
included studies and results are shown in table two.  
 
The outcome of infection transmission was not evaluated in any study.  
 
No studies examined infection rates with different types of PPE.  
 
The outcome of PPE effectiveness was evaluated in one randomised crossover trial that 
examined the performance of different N95 (or higher-level) mask types (cup-type, fold-
type, valve-type) during chest compressions (see Table 2).29 The primary outcome was the 
adequate protection rate (APR) defined as the proportion of participants achieving a good 
fit. During chest compression delivery, the APR differed between study arms (cup-type: 
44.9% (SD 42.8) v fold-type: 93.2% (SD 21.7) v valve-type 59.5% (SD 41.7), P<0.001 for 
difference between groups). For all mask types, APR was lower during chest compression 
delivery than at baseline.  
 
The outcome of CPR quality was evaluated in three studies, two studies reported time taken 
to deliver key interventions,28, 30 and one study by Shin and colleagues (2017), examined 
CPR quality29 with and without PPE (see Table 2).22, 30 In one study, delivery of pre-hospital 
paediatric life support (including bag mask ventilation, defibrillation, tracheal intubation, 
and drug administration) was quickest in individuals not wearing PPE (Control: 261 seconds 
(SD 12) v Conventional air-purifying respirators 275 seconds (SD 9) v air-purifying respirator-
hood 286 seconds (SD 13), p<0.0001).28 In firefighters, the type of gown used, alongside 
other PPE, influenced time to commence chest compressions (standard gown: 71 seconds 
(95% CI 66–77) v modified gown 59 seconds (95% CI 54–63) v no gown 39 seconds (95% CI 







In this systematic review of 11-studies, we identified evidence that chest compressions may 
generate aerosols and are associated in some circumstances, with transmission of infection 
to rescuers. However, in all cases, it is likely there was simultaneous exposure to airway 
manoeuvres, such that the isolated effect of either chest compressions or defibrillation 
could not be reliably identified. Evidence from manikin studies showed that the donning of 
PPE delays the initiation of treatment. Furthermore, PPE may, in many cases, be less 
effective during chest compressions because of the risk of mask slippage, highlighting the 
need for careful donning and ongoing monitoring of effectiveness.  
 
Our findings are broadly similar to those of a Canadian review completed in 2012 which 
found no statistically significant association between SARS transmission and chest 
compression delivery (odds ratio 1.4, 95% confidence interval 0.2 to 11.2) or SARS 
transmission and defibrillation (odds ratio 2.5, 95% confidence interval 0.1 to 43.9). This 
finding was based on data from three observational studies.24, 25, 27 Whilst we included the 
same studies in this review, we decided that it was not methodologically appropriate to 
pool data between studies because of the likelihood that healthcare workers were exposed 
to multiple aerosol generating procedures and owing to the very low rates of disease 
transmission. For example, in one study, only one healthcare worker was infected in both 
the chest compression exposed and defibrillation exposed groups. Our confidence in any 
pooled estimates would be very low.  
 
Since completing the review, we identified via ongoing literature scanning a retrospective 
cohort study of 72 healthcare workers (28 infected with COVID-19; 44 not infected) that met 
inclusion criteria for question two.31 Healthcare workers experienced multiple potential 
exposures as part of their clinical duties.  single non-infected individual was exposed to CPR. 
The risk of COVID-19 transmission in individuals exposed to CPR was not significant (relative 
risk 0.63, 95% confidence interval 0.06 to 7.08). Whilst this additional study does not alter 
the findings of our review, it highlights the rapid publication of much needed new data 
about COVID-19.  
 
Our finding that there is no direct evidence that chest compressions and defibrillation either 
are or are not aerosol generating procedures is important. However, this absence of 
evidence should not be interpreted as providing evidence that these procedures are not 
aerosol generating.  
 
From a physiological perspective, the generation of aerosols by chest compressions is 
clinically plausible, because changes in thoracic pressure during chest compressions 
generate airflow and small exhaled tidal volumes.32 Evidence from the physiotherapy 
literature shows that manual chest physiotherapy techniques do generate aerosols.33 In 
contrast, for defibrillation,32 the mechanism for aerosol generation during defibrillation is 
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less clear. However, tonic muscle spasms caused by defibrillation could conceivably 
generate a small amount of airflow.  
 
For policy makers, there is a need to balance the known risk of treatment delays if PPE is 
donned before chest compressions and defibrillation are delivered, against the unknown, 
but potential, risk of COVID-19 transmission to rescuers. This risk may also extend beyond 
the rescuer, with additional risk of onward transmission to other healthcare workers, 
patients, and the wider community.34 The known risk associated with treatment delay relate 
to the time taken to don PPE and the challenges of delivering effective treatment whilst 
wearing PPE.8-10, 28 Importantly, we found evidence that delivery of chest compressions may 
reduce the effectiveness of face masks.29 
 
This review highlights the urgent need for research to identify and quantify aerosol 
generation associated with chest compressions and defibrillation. This could be undertaken 
using observations in clinical settings, or cadaver or animal models. Such work is essential to 
better understand the potential risk to the rescuer when undertaking these procedures.  
 
The aim of this review was to identify the available evidence relating to aerosol generation, 
infection transmission and protection afforded by personal protective equipment. Beyond 
this specific focus, interpretation of the evidence to guide clinical practice guidelines will 
need careful consideration of the prevalence of COVID-19 in specific settings, the likelihood 
that the resuscitation provider has already been exposed (e.g. close household contact), the 
availability of personal protective equipment, the time taken to train staff in its use, and the 
values and preferences of the wider community where any guidance will be implemented. 
In addition the balance of risks and benefits for specific interventions will vary; for example, 
early defibrillation for a witnessed cardiac arrest compared with cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation for cardiac arrest secondary to refractory hypoxia. As identified in this review, 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation is also a complex intervention comprising ventilation, chest 
compressions, drug therapy and defibrillation, which become difficult to separate out 
without reducing overall clinical effectiveness. Finally, with over one million out of hospital 
cardiac arrests each year around the world and the critical importance of the community’s 
willingness to commence chest compressions and defibrillation, long term unintended 
consequences of restrictive policies need to be considered and necessitate clear 
communication strategies with local communities.  
 
Our review has three key limitations. Firstly, in order to provide an urgent review of 
evidence to meet the needs of the international resuscitation community, we were unable 
to undertake simultaneous independent data extraction and risk of bias assessments. 
Instead, we performed single assessments followed by independent accuracy assessments. 
Secondly, for expediency, we undertook a single search to cover all three questions. If more 
time had been available, we might have considered an individual search strategy for each 
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question which may have increased search sensitivity. To mitigate this, we undertook 
citation tracking of key papers to identify citations not identified in the search. Thirdly, the 
available evidence was typically at high risk of bias and indirect, which limits the inferences 
that can be drawn. This is reflected in our assessment that evidence certainty for all 
outcomes was low or very low.  
 
In conclusion, we identified very limited evidence that does not enable us to estimate the 
risk of chest compressions or defibrillation in relation to aerosol generation and COVID-19 
transmission from the patient to the rescuer. In developing practice recommendations, 
guideline writers must balance an unknown potential infection risk to rescuers against the 
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Box one: research questions 
Research question one 
In individuals in any setting, is delivery of 1) chest compressions, 2) defibrillation or 3) 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation associated with aerosol generation? 
 
Research question two 
In individuals in any setting wearing any/no personal protective equipment, is delivery of 
1) chest compressions, 2) defibrillation or 3) cardiopulmonary resuscitation associated 
with transmission of infection? 
 
Research question three 
In individuals delivering chest compressions and/or defibrillation and/or CPR in any 
setting, does wearing of personal protective equipment compared with wearing any 
alternative system of personal protective equipment or no personal protective equipment 
affect infection with the same organism as the patient, personal protective equipment 













Table 1. Results for question two, investigating the association between chest compressions, defibrillation, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation with transmission of infection 
Study,  Design/ 
setting 




Risk of infection in unexposed Risk of infection in exposed  
Observational studies 








624 HCWs who provided 
care to 45 laboratory 
confirmed SARS patients 
Not recorded Chest compression and 
defibrillation (and 32 
other activities) 
SARS No chest compression: 25/615 (4%) 
 
No defibrillation: 25/620 (4%)† 
Chest compression: 1/9 (11%) 
 
 
Defibrillation: 1/4 (25%) 







32 nurses entering rooms 
with SARS patients 
Variable CPR and defibrillation 
(and 30 other activities) 
SARS No CPR (but other exposures): 8/29 
(28%) 
 
No defibrillation (but other 









477 HCWs (51 case/ 426 
control) 
Variable  Chest compression (and 
27 other factors) 
SARS 11%  










15 HCWs- performed CPR 
on the index patient 
None CPR Panton-Valentine 
leukocidin-
producing S. aureus 
pneumonia 
 1/15 (6.7%) 
Case was in the physician who 
performed tracheal intubation 






9 HCWs- performed CPR on 
the index patient 
Full CPR SARS  1/9 (11%)- 5 tested; 4 refused 
 
Additional ICU nurse (delivered 
compressions only for 10-15min) 
developed symptoms with 
indeterminate SARS serologic findings 







7 HCWs- performed CPR on 
the index patient 
Variable CPR Novel bunyavirus, 
designated SFTS 
virus 
 4/7 (57.1%) 






3 HCWs- performed CPR on 
index patient 
Variable CPR TB  2/3 (66.7%) 






6 HCWs involved in CPR Full CPR MERS  1/6 (16.7%)  
 
†- Multiple other exposures. CPR- Cardiopulmonary defibrillation. SARS-Severe acute respiratory syndrome. TB- Tuberculosis. MERS- Middle East Respiratory Syndrome. ICU- Intensive Care Unit 





Procedure Intervention and comparator Outcomes measured 
Randomised control trials  











Intervention group 1: Conventional air-
purifying respirators (APR)  
 
Intervention group 2: Modern loose-fitting air-
purifying respirator-hoods (PAPR-hood) 
 
Comparator: no PPE 
Treatment duration: 
Control: 261 seconds (SD 12) 
APR: 275 seconds (SD 9)  
PAPR-hood: 286 seconds (SD 13)  
P<0.0001 for difference between 
groups. 








time feedback- adult 
manikin 
Intervention group 1: cup-type respirator mask 
preformed into a cup shape  
 
Intervention group 2:  fold-type respirator 
mask that is flexible and 3-folded 
 
Intervention group 3:  valve-type respirator 
mask similar to the fold-type respirator with 
valve 
Adequate protection rate (%) during chest 
compressions:† 
Cup-type: 44.9% (SD 42.8) 
Fold-type: 93.2% (SD 21.7) 
Valve-type 59.5% (SD 41.7%)  
P<0.001 for difference between 
groups. 
Compression quality similar between groups 
Watson et al 2008 Manikin RCT 
 
Canada 
58 firefighters  
 
Simulated CPR- manikin Intervention Group 1: Standard gown plus N95 
respirator, gloves and eye protection 
 
Intervention group 2: Modified gown and an 
N95 respirator, gloves and eye protection‡ 
 
Comparator: No gown, but PPE included an 
N95 respirator, gloves and eye protection. 
Time to chest compressions (seconds): 
Standard gown: 71 (95% CI 66–77 
Modified gown  59 (95% CI 54–63) 
No gown: 39 (95% CI 34–43) 
P<0.001 for difference between 
groups). 
RCT- Randomised Controlled Trial; SD- Standard Deviation; PPE- Personal protective equipment; 95% CI- 95% confidence interval 
† Fit factor calculated as concentration of particles outside respirator divided by concentration inside respirator (maximum value- 200)-fit factor > 100 considered adequate protection 






Records identified through database 
searching 



























Additional records identified through 
other sources 
Expert consultation (n = 3) 
Citation searching (n = 60) 
 
 
Records after duplicates removed 
(n = 545) 
Records screened 
(n = 545) 
Records excluded 
(n = 507) 
Full-text articles assessed 
for eligibility 
(n = 38) 
Full-text articles excluded, 
with reasons 
(n = 27) 
Non-eligible study design- e.g. 
review (n=6) 
Non-eligible exposure (n=14) 
No relevant outcome (n=4) 
No comparator group (n=3) Studies included in 
qualitative synthesis 
(n = 11) 
Studies included in 
quantitative synthesis  
(n = 0) 
Supplementary information 
Title 






1. Search strategy (full record of search)   
 
2. Full details of the study eligibility criteria 
 
3. List of studies excluded at full text review 
 
4. Quality assessment of included studies  
 











Search date: 24/03/2020 
Database: Ovid MEDLINE(R) ALL <1946 to March 23, 2020> 
Search Strategy: 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1     exp cardiopulmonary resuscitation/ (17618) 
2     heart arrest/ (28725) 
3     out-of-hospital cardiac arrest/ (4046) 
4     electric countershock/ (14654) 
5     defibrillators/ (1774) 
6     (cardiopulmonary resuscitation or defibrillat* or CPR or chest compression* or ((cardiac 
or cardiopulmonary) adj arrest)).ti,ab,kf. (70049) 
7     1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 (91442) 
8     exp Health personnel/ (505028) 
9     exp police/ (5056) 
10     exp firefighters/ (1000) 
11     (health care worker* or healthcare worker* or health care provider* or healthcare 
provider* or physiotherap* or dentist* or nurse* or doctor* or physician* or health 
personnel or medical personnel or hospital personnel or hospital worker* or staff or 
healthcare professional* or health care professional* or care giver* or caregiver* or 
paramedic* or therapist* or bystander* or police* or firefighter* or layperson* or laypeople 
or public).ti,ab,kf. (1497414) 
12     8 or 9 or 10 or 11 (1743878) 
13     cadaver/ (40334) 
14     manikins/ (4981) 
15     (cadaver* or manikin* or mannequin*).ti,ab,kf. (63603) 
16     13 or 14 or 15 (80361) 
17     12 or 16 (1819209) 
18     occupational exposure/ (53787) 
19     air microbiology/ (7553) 
20     infectious disease transmission/ (9010) 
21     infection control/ (23324) 
22     exp cross infection/ (58476) 
23     Disease Outbreaks/ (78245) 
24     Aerosols/ (29986) 
25     ((aerosol* or cough* or droplet* or infection* or infectious or disease*) adj3 (generat* 
or induc* or stimulat* or produc*or creat* or respirable range* or dispers* or transmission 
or transmitted or transmit or spread* or disseminat* or count* or precaution* or control* 
or inhibit* or prevent* or reduc*)).ti,ab,kf. (437175) 
26     cross infection.ti,ab,kf. (2969) 
27     18 or 19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 24 or 25 or 26 (642342) 
28     17 and 27 (91209) 
29     Infectious Disease Transmission, Patient-to-Professional/ (3835) 
30     28 or 29 (93257) 
Supplementary information 
31     7 and 30 (184) 
32     human influenza/ (48279) 
33     exp Influenza A virus/ (42980) 
34     SARS virus/ (2899) 
35     Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome/ (4470) 
36     exp coronavirus/ (11425) 
37     exp Coronavirus Infections/ (9723) 
38     Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus/ (968) 
39     exp tuberculosis/ (190319) 
40     exp pneumonia/ (90583) 
41     (influenza* or H1N1 or tuberculosis or pneumonia or pneumococcus or severe acute 
respiratory syndrome or SARS or MERS or avian flu or swine flu or rhinovirus or acute 
respiratory infection*).ti,ab,kf. (450916) 
42     (((corona* or corono*) adj1 (virus* or viral* or virinae*)) or coronavirus* or 
coronovirus* or coronavirinae* or Coronavirus* or Coronovirus* or Wuhan* or Hubei* or 
Huanan or "2019-nCoV" or 2019nCoV or nCoV2019 or "nCoV-2019" or "COVID-19" or 
COVID19 or "CORVID-19" or CORVID19 or "WN-CoV" or WNCoV or "HCoV-19" or HCoV19 or 
CoV or "2019 novel*" or Ncov or "n-cov" or "SARS-CoV-2" or "SARSCoV-2" or "SARSCoV2" or 
"SARS-CoV2" or SARSCov19 or "SARS-Cov19" or "SARSCov-19" or "SARS-Cov-19" or Ncovor 
or Ncorona* or Ncorono* or NcovWuhan* or NcovHubei* or NcovChina* or 
NcovChinese*).ti,ab,kf. (17835) 
43     Rhinovirus/ (3680) 
44     32 or 33 or 34 or 35 or 36 or 37 or 38 or 39 or 40 or 41 or 42 or 43 (544638) 
45     7 and 17 and 44 (141) 




Search date: 24/03/2020 
Database: Embase Classic+Embase <1947 to 2020 Week 12> 
Search Strategy: 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1     *resuscitation/ (56156) 
2     *heart arrest/ (26461) 
3     *cardiopulmonary arrest/ (1142) 
4     *out of hospital cardiac arrest/ (5817) 
5     *defibrillation/ (4586) 
6     exp *external defibrillator/ (706) 
7     (cardiopulmonary resuscitation or defibrillat* or CPR or chest compression* or ((cardiac 
or cardiopulmonary) adj arrest)).ti,ab,kw. (112209) 
8     1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 (154423) 
9     exp *health care personnel/ (518538) 
10     exp *police/ (3765) 
11     *fire fighter/ (1532) 
12     (health care worker* or healthcare worker* or health care provider* or healthcare 
provider* or physiotherap* or dentist* or nurse* or doctor* or physician* or health 
personnel or medical personnel or hospital personnel or hospital worker* or staff or 
Supplementary information 
healthcare professional* or health care professional* or care giver* or caregiver* or 
paramedic* or therapist* or bystander* or police* or firefighter* or layperson* or laypeople 
or public).ti,ab,kw. (1968709) 
13     9 or 10 or 11 or 12 (2263394) 
14     *cadaver/ (5746) 
15     exp *manikin/ (382) 
16     (cadaver* or manikin* or mannequin*).ti,ab,kw. (84125) 
17     14 or 15 or 16 (86517) 
18     13 or 17 (2343670) 
19     *airborne infection/ (795) 
20     *hospital infection/ (19842) 
21     *virus transmission/ (12660) 
22     *bacterial transmission/ (2301) 
23     *disease transmission/ (9518) 
24     *aerosol/ (24924) 
25     ((aerosol* or cough* or droplet* or infection* or infectious or disease*) adj3 (generat* 
or induc* or stimulat* or produc*or creat* or respirable range* or dispers* or transmission 
or transmitted or transmit or spread* or disseminat* or count* or precaution* or control* 
or inhibit* or prevent* or reduc*)).ti,ab,kw. (588510) 
26     19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 24 or 25 (644165) 
27     18 and 26 (88591) 
28     8 and 27 (240) 
29     exp *influenza virus/ (16773) 
30     exp *influenza/ (51692) 
31     *parainfluenza virus infection/ (258) 
32     *severe acute respiratory syndrome/ (4499) 
33     exp *coronavirus/ (6085) 
34     exp *Coronavirus Infection/ (6335) 
35     *Middle East respiratory syndrome/ (536) 
36     *tuberculosis/ (88342) 
37     *lung tuberculosis/ (50737) 
38     *drug resistant tuberculosis/ (1185) 
39     *streptococcus pneumoniae/ (15862) 
40     *pneumonia/ (49217) 
41     *respiratory syncytial pneumovirus/ (6459) 
42     (influenza* or H1N1 or tuberculosis or pneumonia or pneumococcus or severe acute 
respiratory syndrome or SARS or MERS or avian flu or swine flu or rhinovirus or acute 
respiratory infection*).ti,ab,kw. (565099) 
43     (((corona* or corono*) adj1 (virus* or viral* or virinae*)) or coronavirus* or 
coronovirus* or coronavirinae* or Coronavirus* or Coronovirus* or Wuhan* or Hubei* or 
Huanan or "2019-nCoV" or 2019nCoV or nCoV2019 or "nCoV-2019" or "COVID-19" or 
COVID19 or "CORVID-19" or CORVID19 or "WN-CoV" or WNCoV or "HCoV-19" or HCoV19 or 
CoV or "2019 novel*" or Ncov or "n-cov" or "SARS-CoV-2" or "SARSCoV-2" or "SARSCoV2" or 
"SARS-CoV2" or SARSCov19 or "SARS-Cov19" or "SARSCov-19" or "SARS-Cov-19" or Ncovor 
or Ncorona* or Ncorono* or NcovWuhan* or NcovHubei* or NcovChina* or 
NcovChinese*).ti,ab,kw. (20813) 
44     *rhinovirus/ (2144) 
Supplementary information 
45     29 or 30 or 31 or 32 or 33 or 34 or 35 or 36 or 37 or 38 or 39 or 40 or 41 or 42 or 43 
(639389) 
46     8 and 18 and 45 (357) 
47     28 or 46 (568) 
48     limit 47 to (conference abstract or conference paper or "conference review") (294) 
49     47 not 48 (274) 
 
 
Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (Cochrane Library via Wiley) 
 
Search date: 25/03/2020 
 
ID Search Hits 
#1 [mh "cardiopulmonary resuscitation"] 1019 
#2 [mh ^"heart arrest"] 1053 
#3 [mh ^"out-of-hospital cardiac arrest"] 364 
#4 [mh ^"electric countershock"] 858 
#5 [mh ^defibrillators] 81 
#6 ("cardiopulmonary resuscitation" or defibrillat* or CPR or (chest next compression*) 
or ((cardiac or cardiopulmonary) next arrest)):ti,ab,kw 8632 
#7 #1 or #2 or #3 or #4 or #5 or #6 9168 
#8 [mh "health personnel"] 8364 
#9 [mh police] 65 
#10 [mh firefighters] 37 
#11 (("health care" next worker*) or (healthcare next worker*) or ("health care" next 
provider*) or (healthcare next provider*) or physiotherap* or dentist* or nurse* or doctor* 
or physician* or "health personnel" or "medical personnel" or "hospital personnel" or 
(hospital next worker*) or staff or (healthcare next professional*) or ("health care" next 
professional*) or (care next giver*) or caregiver* or paramedic* or therapist* or bystander* 
or police* or firefighter* or layperson* or laypeople or public):ti,ab,kw 137610 
#12 #8 or #9 or #10 or #11 138631 
#13 [mh ^cadaver] 580 
#14 [mh ^manikins] 839 
#15 (cadaver* or manikin* or mannequin*):ti,ab,kw 4097 
#16 #13 or #14 or #15 4097 
#17 #12 or #16 141620 
#18 [mh ^"occupational exposure"] 502 
#19 [mh ^"air microbiology"] 65 
#20 [mh ^"infectious disease transmission"] 106 
#21 [mh ^"infection control"] 523 
#22 [mh "cross infection"] 1241 
#23 [mh ^"disease outbreaks"] 192 
#24 [mh ^aerosols] 2039 
#25 ((aerosol* or cough* or droplet* or infection* or infectious or disease*) near/3 
(generat* or induc* or stimulat* or produc* or creat* or (respirable next range*) or dispers* 
or transmission or transmitted or transmit or spread* or disseminat* or count* or 
precaution* or control* or inhibit* or prevent* or reduc*)):ti,ab,kw 103502 
Supplementary information 
#26 "cross infection":ti,ab,kw 1218 
#27 #18 or #19 or #20 or #21 or #22 or #23 or #24 or #25 or #26 106205 
#28 #17 and #27 11540 
#29 [mh ^"Infectious Disease Transmission, Patient-to-Professional"] 59 
#30 #28 or #29 11559 
#31 #7 and #30 72 
#32 [mh ^"human influenza"] 2595 
#33 [mh "Influenza A virus"] 836 
#34 [mh ^"SARS virus"] 9 
#35 [mh ^"Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome"] 33 
#36 [mh coronavirus] 11 
#37 [mh "Coronavirus Infections"] 12 
#38 [mh ^"Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus"] 1 
#39 [mh tuberculosis] 557 
#40 [mh pneumonia] 3428 
#41 (influenza* or H1N1 or tuberculosis or pneumonia or pneumococcus or "severe 
acute respiratory syndrome" or SARS or MERS or "avian flu" or "swine flu" or rhinovirus or 
("acute respiratory" next infection*)):ti,ab,kw 29310 
#42 (((corona* or corono*) near/1 (virus* or viral* or virinae*)) or coronavirus* or 
coronovirus* or coronavirinae* or Coronavirus* or Coronovirus* or Wuhan* or Hubei* or 
Huanan or "2019-nCoV" or 2019nCoV or nCoV2019 or "nCoV-2019" or "COVID-19" or 
COVID19 or "CORVID-19" or CORVID19 or "WN-CoV" or WNCoV or "HCoV-19" or HCoV19 or 
CoV or "2019 novel*" or Ncov or "n-cov" or "SARS-CoV-2" or "SARSCoV-2" or "SARSCoV2" or 
"SARS-CoV2" or SARSCov19 or "SARS-Cov19" or "SARSCov-19" or "SARS-Cov-19" or Ncovor 
or Ncorona* or Ncorono* or NcovWuhan* or NcovHubei* or NcovChina* or 
NcovChinese*):ti,ab,kw 412 
#43 [mh ^Rhinovirus] 144 
#44 #32 or #33 or #34 or #35 or #36 or #37 or #38 or #39 or #40 or #41 or #42 or #43
 29660 
#45 #7 and #17 and #44 39 









Search date: 25/03/2020, updated 06/04/2020  
 
Search:  
resuscitation   0 (2 found during update, excluded by two reviewers STP/AG) 
heart arrest   0 
cardiac arrest   0 
cardiopulmonary arrest 0 
defibrillator   0    
Supplementary information 
defibrillators   0 
defibrillation   0 
defibrillate   0 
CPR    0 (1 found during update, excluded by two reviewers STP/AG) 
chest compression  0 
chest compressions  0 
 
 
Forward citation searching 
Science Citation Index (WoS) 
Search date: 23 March 2020 
 





The following reviews were checked: 
 
CADTH. Aerosol-Generating Procedures and Risk of Transmission of Acute Respiratory 
Infections : A Systematic Review. 2011 
https://www.cadth.ca/media/pdf/M0023__Aerosol_Generating_Procedures_e.pdf  
 
Tran K, Cimon K, Severn M, Pessoa-Silva CL, Conly J. Aerosol generating procedures 
and risk of transmission of acute respiratory infections to healthcare workers: a systematic 
review. PLoS ONE 2012;7(4):e35797. https://dx.doi.org10.1371/journal.pone.0035797 
 
Alhazzani W, Moller MH, Arabi YM, Loeb M, Gong MN, Fan E, et al. Surviving Sepsis 
Campaign: guidelines on the management of critically ill adults with Coronavirus Disease 




One additional study identified: 
Raboud J, Shigayeva A, McGeer A, Bontovics E, Chapman M, Gravel D, et al. Risk 
factors for SARS transmission from patients requiring intubation: a multicentre investigation 




2. Full details of the study eligibility criteria 
 
 Include Exclude 
Question one Population - Individuals in any setting 
 
Exposure - Delivery of: 
1) Chest compressions 
2) Defibrillation 
3) CPR (all CPR-interventions that include chest compressions) 
 
Delivery may be by human or mechanical chest compression device to patient or 
cadaver.  
 
Outcome - Aerosol generation (reported to be associated with exposure) 
 




Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) and non-randomized studies (non-randomized 
controlled trials, interrupted time series, controlled before-and-after studies, cohort 
studies, case reports/series, cadaver studies) are eligible for inclusion. Unpublished 








Non-primary research- reviews, 





Question two Population - Individuals in any setting 
 
Exposure - Delivery of: 








3) CPR (all CPR-interventions that include chest compressions) 
 
Delivery may be by human or mechanical chest compression device to patient.  
 
Outcome - Transmission of any viral or bacterial or fungal infection- must be reported 
transmission or reports of no transmission (in studies with comparator group).  
 
Study design 
Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) and non-randomized studies (non-randomized 
controlled trials, interrupted time series, controlled before-and-after studies, cohort 
studies, case reports/ series). 
 
Non-primary research- reviews, 







Population - Individuals delivering chest compressions and/or defibrillation and/ or 
CPR in any setting 
 
Intervention - Wearing of personal protective equipment 
 
Comparator - Wearing any alternative system of personal protective equipment or no 
personal protective equipment 
Includes wearing normal clothing/ no PPE 
 
Outcome - Infection with the same organism as patient (can be any infection) 
 
PPE effectiveness- example mask slippage, areas of exposure 
 
Quality of CPR- chest compression depth, chest compression rate, no-flow time, flow-







Non-primary research- reviews, 






Studies of hazmat suits 
 
Studies without a control group 
Supplementary information 
Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) and non-randomized studies (non-randomized 
controlled trials, interrupted time series, controlled before-and-after studies, cohort 




3. List of studies excluded at full text review 
 
Excluded studies Reason  
1 Abrahamson, S. D., et al. (2006). "Using simulation for training 
and to change protocol during the outbreak of severe acute 
respiratory syndrome." Critical Care (London, England) 10(1): R3. 
 
Study design - 
narrative 
review  
2 Al-Dorzi, H. M., et al. (2016). "The critical care response to a 
hospital outbreak of Middle East respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection: an observational study." 





3 Alraddadi, B. M., et al. (2019). "Noninvasive ventilation in 
critically ill patients with the Middle East respiratory syndrome." 





4 Arabi, Y. M., et al. (2014). "Clinical Course and Outcomes of 
Critically Ill Patients With Middle East Respiratory Syndrome 
Coronavirus Infection." Annals of Internal Medicine 160(6): 389-
+. 
 
Study design – 
epidemiological  
5 Blenkharn, J. I., et al. (1990). "Prevention of transmission of 






6 Chuang, H. L., et al. (2007). "Impact of enhanced infection control 
procedures on clinical outcome following resuscitation 





7 Hassaniazad, M., et al. (2016). "Preventive measures for 
Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever in healthcare workers; how 
high is the chance of transmission?" Acta Medica Mediterranea 
32(SpecialIssue5): 2017-1024. 
 
Study design – 
not case study  
8 Hui, D. S. (2013). "Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): 
lessons learnt in Hong Kong." Journal of Thoracic Disease 5: S122-
S126. 
 
Study design - 
narrative 
review 
9 Lightsey, D. M., et al. (1992). "A human immunodeficiency virus-
resistant airway for cardiopulmonary resuscitation." American 
Journal of Emergency Medicine 10(1): 73-77. 
 
Outcome – no 
eligible 
outcomes  
10 Lufkin, K. C. and E. Ruiz (1993). "Mouth-to-mouth ventilation of 
cardiac arrested humans using a barrier mask." Prehospital & 
Disaster Medicine 8(4): 333-335. 
 




11 MacIntyre CR, Wang Q, Cauchemez S, Seale H, Dwyer DE, Yang P, 
Shi W, Gao Z, Pang X, Zhang Y, Wang X, Duan W, Rahman B, 
Ferguson N, (2011) A cluster randomized clinical trial comparing 
fit-tested and non-fit-tested N95 respirators to medical masks to 
prevent respiratory virus infection in health care workers. 





12 MacIntyre CR, Wang Q, Seale H, Yang P, Shi W, Gao Z, Rahman B, 
Zhang Y, Wang X, Newall AT, Heywood A, Dwyer DE, (2013) A 
randomized clinical trial of three options for N95 respirators and 






13 MacIntyre CR, Wang Q, Rahman B, Seale H, Ridda I, Gao Z, Yang 
P, Shi W, Pang X, Zhang Y, Moa A, Dwyer DE, (2014) Efficacy of 
face masks and respirators in preventing upper respiratory tract 
bacterial colonization and co-infection in hospital healthcare 





14 Milton DK, Fabian MP, Cowling BJ, Grantham ML, McDevitt JJ, 
(2013) Influenza virus aerosols in human exhaled breath: particle 






15 Piegeler, T., et al. (2016). "Evaluation of six different airway 
devices regarding regurgitation and pulmonary aspiration during 
cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) - A human cadaver pilot 
study." Resuscitation 102: 70-74. 
 
Outcome – no 
eligible 
outcomes 
16 Radonovich LJ, Jr., Simberkoff MS, Bessesen MT, Brown AC, 
Cummings DAT, Gaydos CA, Los JG, Krosche AE, Gibert CL, Gorse 
GJ, Nyquist AC, Reich NG, Rodriguez-Barradas MC, Price CS, Perl 
TM, Res Pi, (2019) N95 Respirators vs Medical Masks for 
Preventing Influenza Among Health Care Personnel: A 





17 Rule, A. M., et al. (2018). "Healthcare personnel exposure in an 
emergency department during influenza season." PLoS ONE 





18 Sietsema, M. and L. M. Brosseau (2018). "Are quantitative fit 
factors predictive of respirator fit during simulated healthcare 







19 Thompson, K. A., et al. (2013). "Influenza Aerosols in UK Hospitals 
during the H1N1 (2009) Pandemic - The Risk of Aerosol 
Generation during Medical Procedures." PLoS ONE [Electronic 





20 Tran K, Cimon K, Severn M, Pessoa-Silva CL, Conly J, (2012) 
Aerosol generating procedures and risk of transmission of acute 
respiratory infections to healthcare workers: a systematic review. 
PLoS 
One 7: e35797 
 
Study design – 
systematic 
review 
21 Twu SJ, Chen TJ, Chen CJ, Olsen SJ, Lee LT, Fisk T, Hsu KH, Chang 
SC, Chen KT, Chiang IH, Wu YC, Wu JS, Dowell SF, (2003) Control 
measures for severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 





22 Watson, C. M., et al. (2011). "Simulated pediatric resuscitation 
use for personal protective equipment adherence measurement 
and training during the 2009 influenza (H1N1) pandemic." Joint 
Commission journal on quality and patient safety / Joint 





23 Watson, L., et al. (2008). "The "delay effect" of donning a gown 
during cardiopulmonary resuscitation in a simulation model." 






24 Weber, R. T., et al. (2019). "Environmental and Personal 
Protective Equipment Contamination during Simulated 






25 Wong, E. and K. K. Ho (2006). "The effect of severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) on emergency airway 





26 Yam LY, Chen RC, Zhong NS, (2003) SARS: ventilatory and 
intensive care. Respirology 8 Suppl: 
S31-35 
 
Study design - 
narrative 
review 
27 Yu, I. T., et al. (2007). "Why did outbreaks of severe acute 
respiratory syndrome occur in some hospital wards but not in 
others?" Clinical Infectious Diseases 44(8): 1017-1025. 
 








4. Quality assessment of included studies  
 
Quality assessment of included case reports and case-series 
Tool for evaluating the methodological quality of case reports and case series 
Study Selection Ascertainment Causality Reporting Comments 







(centre) or is 
the selection 
method 


































































et al 2004  
Yes No No No NA NA Yes Yes No additional health 
care activities other 
than CPR were 
recorded. The study 
assumes that CPR 
was the activity that 
caused transmission 




Only 5/9 HCWs were 
tested for antibodies. 




al  2016  
Yes Yes Yes Yes NA NA Yes Yes Emergency physician 
was only involved in 
CPR during care of 
patient 
Kim et al 
2015  
Yes No Yes No NA NA Yes Yes Unlikely that CPR was 
the only clinical 
activity. There is 
therefore some 
uncertainty over the 
type of exposure and 
whether transmission 
can be attributed to 
CPR. 
Chalumea
u et al 
2005 
 
Yes Yes No No NA NA Yes Yes The study 
demonstrated that 
the same strain of 
Staph. aureus 
infected both the 
index case and the 
physician. It is most 
likely that the 
transmission 
occurred during CPR 
Nam et al 
2017 
 




infection from Case B 
to Case C (the HCW). 
There was CCTV 
footage showing the 
most likely period 





Quality assessment of included case control studies  
Tool for evaluating the methodological quality of case control studies 
Study  1. Can we be 
confident in the 
assessment of 
exposure? 








3. Were the cases 
(those who were 
exposed and 
developed the 
outcome of interest) 
properly 
selected? 
4. Were the controls 
(those who were 
exposed and did not 
develop the outcome of 
interest) properly 
selected? 




variables or was statistical 






Probably yes Definitely yes Probably no Definitely yes Probably yes Potential recall bias as HCW 
were asked about the type of 
patient contact. 
2 cases were excluded that 
are believed to have 
contracted the infection 
outside of the hospital. 
Unclear how contracting of 





Quality assessment of included cohort studies  
Tool for evaluating the methodological quality of cohort studies 























































6. Can we be 
confident in the 
assessment of 
outcome? 

























HCWs were interviewed 
as part of a public 
health investigation into 
the transmission of 
SARS-CoV. No record 
available when HCWs 
were interviewed. 
Interviews were used to 
identify additional 
HCWs who may have 
been in contact with the 
Supplementary information 
patients, exposure and 
to collect data on PPE. 
Potential recall bias. 
Loeb et 













Only 3 CPRs and 2 
Defibrillations, unclear 
whether HCWs had 
different PPE to those 
involved in other 
activities and got 
infected 
 
Quality assessment of included randomised controlled trials 





































et al 2013  
Unclear Unclear Unclear Low High High Low Fully crossed RCT design so imbalances at 
baseline not a concern. Very limited 
reporting of methods.  
Shin et al 
2017  
Low High Low Low Unclear Unclear Low Fully crossed RCT design so imbalances at 
baseline not a concern. 
Watson et 
al 2008  
Unclear Unclear High High High Unclear Unclear Small numbers of participants, not a 
crossover trial so high risk of imbalance at 
baseline. Baseline characteristics by group 
not reported.  
  
Supplementary information 
5. GRADE tables  
 
 Research question one: In individuals in any setting (population), is delivery of 1) chest compressions, 2) defibrillation or 3) cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
(exposures) associated with aerosol generation (outcome)? 
 Research question two: In individuals in any setting wearing any/ no personal protective equipment (population), is delivery of 1) chest compressions, 2) 
defibrillation or 3) cardiopulmonary resuscitation (exposures) associated with transmission of infection (outcome)? 
 Research question three: In individuals delivering chest compressions and/or defibrillation and/ or CPR in any setting (population), does wearing of 
personal protective equipment (intervention) compared with wearing any alternative system of personal protective equipment or no personal protective 
equipment (comparator) affect infection with the same organism as the patient, personal protective equipment effectiveness, or quality of CPR 
(outcomes)? 
 









Research question 1- aerosol generation 
2  observational 
studies  
serious a not serious  serious b not serious  none  
 
⨁◯◯◯ 
VERY LOW  
CRITICAL  
Research question 2- transmission of infection 
8  observational 
studies  
very serious c not serious  serious b not serious  none  
 
⨁◯◯◯ 
VERY LOW  
CRITICAL  
Research question 3- Infection with same organism as patient 
0  
       
-  CRITICAL  
Research question 3- personal protective equipment effectiveness 
3  randomised 
trials  





Research question 3- quality of CPR 
3  randomised 
trials  
very serious f not serious  serious e not serious  none  
 
⨁◯◯◯ 
VERY LOW  
IMPORTANT  
CI: Confidence interval 
Explanations 
a. Only evidence type was case reports  
b. Did not describe COVID-19 (based on other infections)  
Supplementary information 
c. Evidence from studies with very serious risk of bias and from case reports  
d. Data from randomised controlled trial with serious risk of bias  
e. Data based on manikin studies  
f. Data from randomised controlled trials with very serious risk of bias  
 
 
 
 
